by Blerim Reka
For more than a century, peace in the Western Balkans has depended on relations between its two biggest peoples: the Albanians and the Serbs. Their territorial dispute over Kosovo, which has raged since Serbia annexed the territory at the end of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), has created a permanent condition of instability.
But a decade after Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia (under cover from a United Nations mission and the NATO-led Kosovo Force-KFOR), the first signs of a realistic approach are coming from Belgrade. Last summer, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic called for a “broad national debate on Kosovo,” which could make for a hot political winter.
It appears that Serbia’s state elite has finally understood that the Kosovo case should be closed, either by a historical agreement between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbia (the more probable scenario) or through a territorial exchange (less likely). Both possibilities will have geopolitical consequences.
Serbia’s political leadership began to prepare public opinion for this opening last summer. In July, President Vucic explained to the popular tabloid daily Blic that Serbia had underestimated Albanian national aspirations since the League of Prizren, founded by Albanian activists in 1878. It was time for Serbia “to stop burying its head in the sand” on Kosovo and start “an internal dialogue,” Mr. Vucic said in the interview, because “we must try to be realistic – not lose or give away what we still have, but not expect to get back what we lost long ago.”
The 80 percent solution
Armed with a fresh five-year mandate, and with impeccable nationalist credentials, the Serbian president could afford to touch the sore spot in much the same way that Cold Warrior Richard Nixon could go to China. Albanians and Serbians should look for a deal, Mr. Vucic said in an August television interview, because “if we achieve peace between the two biggest nations, we will solve 80 percent of all problems for the next 100 years.”
Assuming this is not just talk, President Vucic can count on support from the European Union and the United States. EU diplomatic chief Federica Mogherini praised Serbia’s “constructive” attitude in the Brussels-facilitated Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, which aims to have a final Serbia-Kosovo agreement by 2019.
Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic, however, while acknowledging that “Serbia’s policy on Kosovo has failed,” argued publicly in August that what was needed is a territorial partition – an option that he said would be supported by Russia. This made clear that Mr. Vucic’s “internal debate” would involve outside powers and determine Serbia’s place in the international system – aligned with Russia or with the West.
The timing for President Vucic’s demarche appears to have been inspired by his July trip to Washington, where he met with U.S. Vice President Mike Pence. Mr. Vucic was clearly feeling the pressure after German Chancellor Angela Merkel warned, earlier in the year, that Serbia could not join the EU without normalizing its relations with Kosovo.
The Serbian president’s brainstorm, which came at a time of increased U.S.-Russian tensions over the Balkans, was that resolving the Kosovo dispute would free him from dependence on both Washington and Moscow. Belgrade had already tried a two-track policy – applying for EU membership but also relying on Russian support for its claim to Kosovo – and that approach had failed.
Moscow still sees Belgrade as a key ally in the Balkans, and Serbian Defense Minister Aleksandar Vulin declared during a trip to Moscow in August that his country “will never join NATO.” Serbia’s military regularly participates in joint maneuvers with Russian forces, is seeking deliveries of MIG-29 fighter jets and helicopters from Russia, and hosts a “Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center” at Nis that is regarded as potentially the opening wedge for a direct Russian military presence. Indeed, the U.S. recently warned Belgrade not to extend diplomatic status to this center.
NATO, meanwhile, discussed the future of its KFOR mission at the mid-September meeting of its Military Committee in Tirana. The Committee’s chairman, Czech General Petr Pavel, became the first senior NATO official to state publicly that Kosovo, as a sovereign state, could have its own army.
Unless the conciliatory rhetoric is a smokescreen to deceive foreign observers, this winter could see a struggle over which vision prevails in Serbia – Mr. Vucic’s orientation toward Europe, or Mr. Dacic’s embrace of Slavic brotherhood. Yet Serbia’s biggest strategic dilemma is how to rid itself of both entanglements: Kosovo and Russia.
Both sides start from diametrically opposed geopolitical orientations. Almost 90 percent of Kosovars have a positive attitude toward NATO, while in Serbia the total is 3 percent. How can these viewpoints be reconciled? Six years of negotiations sponsored by Brussels have yielded meager results.
A new phase and format of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue was launched on August 31, with the goal of achieving a full reconciliation within three years. The likely outcome would be for Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s independence, allowing the former to join the EU, and the latter to become the newest member of the United Nations.
In a speech to the European Parliament, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said one of his top priorities was executing “the strategy for a successful EU accession of Serbia and Montenegro as frontrunner candidates in the Western Balkans.” However, Johannes Hahn, the EU commissioner overseeing enlargement, said during a visit to Belgrade that this was conditional on settling the Kosovo problem – which the EU “doesn’t want inside the Union.”
Successful EU mediation of the Kosovo-Serbia talks will probably be impossible without support from Washington and a strong American presence. It is therefore desirable that the latest round of talks include the U.S. No Balkans crisis will be resolved without active American engagement.
Looking forward to 2019, there seem to be at least two plausible scenarios.
Option 1: Accepting Kosovo
The most likely scenario is that Serbia finally comes to terms with post-2008 realities. By recognizing Kosovo – if not now, at least within the next two years – Belgrade would win its release from a century-old problem and unblock its Euro-Atlantic future. Secure in his five-year presidential term, Mr. Vucic has time to let the “internal debate on Kosovo” steer public opinion toward a more realistic approach. At present, the only thing that is still “Serbian” about Kosovo is its place in the preamble of Serbia’s constitution. And Mr. Vucic, for all his popularity, may find it hard to persuade two-thirds of the country’s parliament to amend that document.
Along with his own Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the president can count on scattered support from the opposition, including Cedomir Jovanovic’s Liberal Democrats and Nenad Canak’s Social Democratic League of Vojvodina. Within the ruling coalition, he has even picked up support from the nationalist Serbian Renewal Movement, whose leader Vuk Draskovic had earlier called on Serbs to “accept and recognize the reality in Kosovo as the basis for a sustainable solution.”
But other key players – such as the right-wing Dveri Movement, the Democratic Party and the Socialists (who are inside the government coalition) – are adamantly opposed to recognizing Kosovo.
Given the sharp divisions over Kosovo among Serbian political parties, even within the government coalition, President Vucic can only hope to build a national consensus by winning over two key opinion shapers: the Serbian Orthodox Church (which still regards Kosovo as “Serbia’s heartland”) and the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. The latter institution has traditionally been identified with a hard-line orientation (the SANU memorandum drafted by 16 academy members in 1986 is sometimes regarded as a blueprint for Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s strategy during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s), but it has recently taken a moderate stand on the Kosovo issue.
After a difficult national debate, and if Mr. Vucic succeeds in securing broad public support and the necessary parliamentary votes, the preamble could be amended in 2018, along with other constitutional changes (on the judiciary and the rule of law) that Brussels requested during the EU accession talks.
One quid pro quo Mr. Vucic may expect for recognizing Kosovo’s de jure exit from Serbia (18 years after the fact) is that Serbia will be allowed to retain a special relationship with Republika Srpska. In Washington, the Serbian president got a clear message not to plan any reunification with the Bosnian Serbs. Nevertheless, together with Republika Srpska’s President Milorad Dodik, Mr. Vucic declared in August his intention to draft a “declaration on the preservation of Serbian national identity” in the other former Yugoslav states. The initiative was backed by Russia, which hosted a meeting of Serbian political parties in Moscow to discuss the initiative.
Mr. Vucic’s plan is still to cut Kosovo loose, removing the key obstacle to Serbia’s EU accession path. If Serbia accepts the loss of Kosovo by amending its own constitution, Russia could hardly veto its admission to the United Nations – especially after Vladimir Putin’s famous comparison of Crimea’s right to self-determination to Kosovo’s.
The Serbian president’s timetable assumes a two-track dialogue with Brussels and with his fellow citizens